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Trading For Security Military Alliances And Economic Agreements

Non classé / No Comment / 13 avril 2021

Finally, there are costs for alliances. The cost of a country i is an alliance with the country j is some cij (g) >0. This could involve the cost of opening diplomatic, military and communication channels, coordinating military operations or intelligence services, or other related costs. We generally assume that the cost of alliances is low compared to potential war powers, otherwise the analysis is degenerate. Country i receives a payment or utility from the g network of ui (g) which gave the economic benefits of trade as a function of the g network. We are now introducing the concept of war stability, which takes into account the incentives of countries to conquer other countries and to add or suppress alliances. First, we present the definition that does not include trade. The motivation to attack another country comes from economic prey. These are expected damage and other costs of war. The expected net profit from the gain of a war is then presented as Eik (g,C) which is the total economic benefits of country k when country i is conquered by a coalition C with k∈C, if the network is g and I am defended by the coalition, i.e. ∪ (N) ∩Cc). The enormous cost of war makes it imperative to understand the conditions under which wars can be avoided. Although much is known about bilateral conflicts, there is no formal theory of how international multilateral relations networks encourage and discourage intergovernmental wars. We are developing a model of networks of military alliances and international trade that can serve as a basis for studying the structure of the international alliance and conflicts.

Any regular network (i.e., each country has alliances of) for which two countries have no more than k<d-1 in common is a highly stable network in terms of war and trade when γ≥ (d-1)/d-k-1). My thesis has gained new empirical knowledge on how economic cooperation improves security cooperation. I have shown that economic cooperation strengthens the credibility of an alliance commitment and has shown that offers of economic cooperation can above all ensure military cooperation.

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